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TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE UNDER THE
NAFTA SYSTEM: A CALL FOR LEGITIMATE
PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, the continent of North America embarked on a new age of
trade and commerce with the activation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).' The governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States officially
joined together to reduce and/or eliminate virtually all barriers to trade between the
triumvirate, based upon the agreement reached by the leadership of each of the three
countries. Toward this end, the agreement deals significantly with the more obvious
barriers of tariffs and quota systems which clearly limit the entry of foreign goods into
each country.2 In addition, the agreement seeks to preclude regulations and standards,
known as Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs),3 which unjustly treat foreign goods in
an unequal or protectionist manner. While much of the agreement's language is merely
hortatory in nature, only urging changes in the domestic laws of the member states,
there are also more substantial clauses that impose mandatory compliance by those
states.4
This mandatory nature of the statutory language may allow NAFTA to interfere
with a member state's right to establish standards and measures which are intended to
serve and protect the citizens of that member state. The degree of interference is deter-
mined by two elements: 1) the scope of the language of Chapter 9, and 2) the devel-
oping jurisprudence of North American trade law, which provides meaning and empha-
sis to the specific language of the agreement when applied to specific trade disputes.
Although NAFTA remains in its infancy, and to date there are no official com-
plaints filed under the NAFTA provisions which deal with these TBTs, an assessment
of Chapter 9 is possible. By examining Chapter 9 through the lenses of both the US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement' and the Treaty of Rome,6 one can measure the untest-
ed textual provisions of NAFTA against two established trade agreements for potential
over-interference in the regulatory protection allowed to member states. Further, the
FTA also provides insight as to the developing theories of trade in North America.
1. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter NAFrA].
2. Id. at Preamble, which states in part: "REDUCE disruptions to trade; ESTABLISH clear and
mutually advantageous rules governing their trade; ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for
business planning and investment."
3. Id. art. 901.
4. Boundary Supremacy for Businesses and Sovereigns, THE RECORDER, July 8, 1994.
5. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, January 1, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter
FTA].
6. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I1
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Given the nature of any trade agreement, a state gives up a portion of its own
sovereignty, however small that portion may be, when that state accepts the provisions
of an agreement. Of course, by accepting the terms of the given agreement, the state
makes this sacrifice willingly. However, this willingness extends only to the limit of
the state's understanding of the agreement. Herein lies the major stumbling block of
limitation clauses and restrictions on state action: what exactly is prohibited by an
agreement, and under what standards are those prohibitions defined?
Through the NAFTA, the member states recognized a need to limit those stan-
dards and other TBTs that may be erected by a member state which serve to interfere
with the precepts of free trade and are without legitimate basis.7 The problem arises in
determining which TBTs are legitimate and which are merely disguised attempts of
unequal treatment for economic advantage.
Articles 904(1) and (2) of NAFTA Chapter 9 clearly authorize a member state to
establish both standards-related measures and other levels of protection that relate to
safety; the protection of human, animal or plant life or health; the environment; or
consumers. However, Chapter 9 also limits the establishment of technical barriers if
those barriers are adopted, maintained or applied as an unnecessary obstacle to trade
between the parties s If the measure has a demonstrable purpose to a legitimate objec-
tive, a term which embodies the categories of Article 904' and it does not exclude
goods that comply with that objective, the barrier will not be classified as an unneces-
sary obstacle.
Thus, the crux of NAFTA's standards and regulation provisions lies with the
determination of whether the stated objective of a regulation is, in fact, legitimately
based in one of the protected categories listed, or is merely a facade for a protectionist
stance. If the objective is legitimate, a secondary question arises concerning whether
the goods in question, in fact, comply with that legitimate objective. Pursuant to Arti-
cle 913(2)(c), the Committee on Standards-Related Measures provides the forum ad-
dressing such issues and making determinations of legitimacy.
As previously stated, there have been no hearings, or otherwise, to demonstrate
the full capacity of the Committee's scope and authority. However, the use of the FTA
and the Treaty of Rome can provide the necessary insight.
7. No party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure
with a view to or with the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between
the Parties. An unnecessary obstacle to trade shall not be deemed to be created where:
(a) the demonstrable purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective; and (b)
the measure does not operate to exclude goods of another Party that meet that legitimate
objective.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904(4).
8. id.
9. ILlegitimate objective includes an objective such as: (a) safety, (b) protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, including matters
relating to quality and identifiability of goods or services, and (c) sustainable develop-
ment, considering, among other things, where appropriate, fundamental climatic or other
geographical factors, technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific justification but
does not include the protection of domestic production.
Id. art. 915.
[Vol. 2 1:11.1
Trade Barriers Under NAFTA
A. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
As an acknowledged model and predecessor'0 of the current NAFTA agreement,
the FTA and its workings can be used to shed light on the future TBT problems that
may face NAFTA. Because the FTA involved two of the three NAFTA member states,
many of the same specific concerns have been addressed in both documents." As
does NAFrA, 2 the FTA adopted both the theory of national treatment, 3 embodied
in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the concept
of limiting technical standards between member states. 4
National treatment requires that a state not discriminate or otherwise impede
foreign products to a greater degree than they do domestic products. This policy pre-
cludes an unfair favoritism of the domestic products, which would effectively establish
a market barrier. As a compliment to this, limited technical standards attempt to facili-
tate trade among states by simplifying the trade system through a reduction in the
number of various technical barriers in existence. By promoting and developing a
universal set of standards to which all participating states adhere, simplification is
achieved.
Concerning the propriety of TBTs under a free trade agreement, the ETA covers
national treatment of goods under Chapter 5 and defines "legitimate objectives"'"
which allows the establishment of TBTs in Chapter 6. Each of these chapters clearly
adopts the respective GATT provisions as part of the FrA. 6
Related to technical barriers and their application, the Canada-United States Free
Trade Commission 7 has sent three main TBT cases before separate panels for deter-
mination: Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,"
Lobster from Canada,9 and Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import and Sale of UHT
Milk from Quebec.' In each of these cases, the panel has attempted to give full and
fair meaning to the FTA and the GATT agreements, as established by the FTA. How-
ever, as seen below, there are points in each case that demonstrate that those two
agreements are not foolproof in their protection of the reserved rights of the member
state to erect legitimate TBTs.
10. Charles R. Johnson, et al., Summary of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in
NAFTA: North American Free-Trade Agreements, Treaty Materials 1 (1993).
11. Id.
12. NAFrA, supra note 1, ch. 9.
13. FTA, supra note 5, art. 501.
14. Id. ch. 6.
15. Supra note 9.
16. FIA, supra notes 13 and 14.
17. Id. art. 1802. The Free Trade Commission is the enforcement body which deals with TBT
violation complaints under the FTA.
18. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring;
NAFrA: North American Free Trade Agreements, Dispute Resolution; CDA 89-1807-01; October 16,
1989 [hereinafter Pacific Coast Salmon].
19. In the Matter of Lobsters from Canada; NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreements,
Dispute Resolution; USA 89-1807-01; May 21, 1990 [hereinafter Lobsters from Canada].
20. In the Matter of Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T. Milk
from Quebec; NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreements, Dispute Resolution; USA 93-1807-01;
June 3, 1993 [hereinafter UHT Milk from Quebec].
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B. The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome2 is the basic document of the European Union (EU),
22
the modem world's first major common market. While different in total scope and ulti-
mate goal23 than the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States, the
EU has some significant similarities that make it useful in examining NAFTA.
Principally, in reference to TBTs, Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits
both quantitative restrictions as well as measures of equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions." The European Court of Justice interpreted quantitative restrictions as
measures which amount to a total or partial restraint on imports, exports, or goods in
transit.' By definition, measures of equivalent effect are much broader in scope than
the quantitative restriction classification, and have been deemed to include both mea-
sures that apply solely to foreign goods (distinctly applicable) and measures that do not
distinguish between domestic and foreign goods (indistinctly applicable).'
These two elements of Article 30 have been developed through European case
law. In what has become known as the Dassonville formula,' the European Court of
Justice established the concept that trading rules implemented by member states that
serve to hinder intra-community trade, directly or indirectly, are to be considered as
measures having equivalent effect. Coupled with this is the Rule of Reason,28 which
finds that measures falling within the Dassonville formula may nonetheless be permit-
ted under Article 30, provided they are "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory re-
quirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protec-
tion of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the
consumer."
29
Thus, it appears that the stage is set for Article 30 to be applied only in cases
where reason dictated that the interests of the Common Market were being unduly
sacrificed by import restrictions. Despite this, European case law has demonstrated that
even the most logical of agreements and principals are in danger of over-zealous inter-
pretation.
21. Treaty of Rome, supra note 6.
22. Originally, the Treaty of Rome established what was known as the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). As the trade union progressed, the states involved became a more tightly knit group
and developed into what was known as the European Community (EC) under the Single European Act
1986. In 1993, a further step toward a federal Europe was taken with the passage of the European
Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, known as the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European
Union (EU). However, the relevant trade provisions of the Treaty of Rome remain intact.
23. The scope and ultimate goal of the Treaty of Rome was to unify Europe into a dependant
coalition of states, in order to avoid the hostilities that gave rise to World War H.
24. Eric L. White, In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, 26 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 235, 241 (1989).
25. Josephine Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law 82 (1992).
26. White, supra note 24.
27. Stemming from Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
28. Developed in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649,
3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979) [hereinafter Rewe-Zentral].
29. Josephine Steiner, Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC, 29 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 749, 752 (1992).
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III. NAFTA ARTICLE NINE AND TWO HAZARDS OF THE FREE TRADE
CONCEPT
Despite the many lauded benefits and high points of a free trade system, there
are some dangerous pitfalls that must be examined in light of the TBT provisions
included in NAFTA. While some of these pitfalls must be accepted as necessary evils
toward a greater benefit, others can be satisfactorily answered without sacrificing the
end goal of increased fair trade.
A. Rejection of Legitimate Concerns
Just as in NAFTA, both the Treaty of Rome and the FTA define what is an
acceptable legitimate objective for a TBT. The FTA specifically covers this definition
in Article 609," while the Treaty of Rome has a definition that has evolved from case
law and directives into what is now, known as the Rule of Reason. While not mirror
images of each other, both of those definitions include, among other things, the de-
fense of the public health and consumer protection. However, despite the seeming
clarity of the terms, each agreement has seen its legitimate objective provisions over-
ridden in the name of free trade.
1. Pacific Coast Salmon
Under the FTA, three major cases concerning TBTs have been brought before a
binational panel. In two of the three cases, the binational panel called into question the
validity of the barrier and, at least, to some degree called for reduction of the barrier.
In Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,3 the panel
considered Canadian regulations which forced all catches of pacific coast salmon and
herring from Canadian waters to be landed on Canadian soil prior to processing for
verification and data collection.' The government of Canada justified the regulations
as environmental conservation measures necessary to insure that the target species
were not subject to over-fishing and to maintain current data on the bio-diversity of the
species.33 Further, because the regulations applied to catches that were to remain in
Canada, as well as, those that would be exported to the United States, Canada main-
tained that the provisions that met the national treatment requirements were not dis-
criminatory to foreign trade.'
The United States objected to the provisions, stating that they were discriminato-
ry in that they forced a raise in price of affected fish exported to the United States.3"
In addition, the regulations were argued to be unnecessarily intrusive on free trade and
that results similar to those intended could be achieved through other less intrusive
means.3
The panel, in a typical example of soft diplomatic compromise, found that the
30. The article states, in pertinent part "[Ilegitimate domestic objective means an objective whose
purpose is to protect health, safety, essential security, the environment or consumer interests[,J" FTA,
supra note 5, art. 609.
31. Pacific Coast Salmon, CDA 89-1807-01.
32. Id. at para. 2.03.
33. Id.
34. Id. at para. 5.02.
35. Id. at para. 5.01.
36. Id. at para. 5.03.
1995]
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conservation interest of Canada did justify a landing regulation to verify and collect the
necessary data; however, the panel also determined that a 100% landing requirement
was not necessary.3" Instead, data sufficient for conservation purposes could be
achieved by examining the current landed volume from a given fishery, which made
up 80-90% of the total catch. The panal recognized this on the provisional basis that
the unlanded export catch not excede the current level of 10-20% of the total catch
volume of the species in question."a Because the situation at the time of complaint did
not require active intervention, the panel determined that the Canadian regulation was
not within the realm of a legitimate objective as defined under the FTA. Such an inter-
pretation of the FTA is patently dangerous.
The entire purpose of allowing certain TBTs to exist under a free trade arrange-
ment is to allow member states to maintain some sovereign control in appropriate
situations of a legitimate domestic objective. If that control is effectively emasculated
by precluding domestic policy in the name of free trade, that state, as well as other
states, with intertwining interests, may well be injured by its lack of power to protect
those legitimate interests. Pursuant to the definitions set out in Article 609, the FTA
includes the protection of both the environment and consumer interests, each of which
would be impacted by over-fishing. If the salmon stock is effectively wiped out as a
result of over-fishing, it is the Canadians who stand to lose the most. Therefore, such a
pro-active measure should be allowed in order to protect a member state's recognized
interest from destruction.
2. UHT Milk from Quebec
These same types of concerns were revisited most recently in UHT Milk from
Quebec.39 The territory of Puerto Rico, in revamping its regulations to improve the
quality of milk production, joined the National Conference on Interstate Milk Ship-
ments (NCIMS) ° in 1987. As a part of membership to NCIMS, Puerto Rico was ob-
ligated to adopt the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance (PMO). The purpose of this American
program was to enforce strict sanitation standards to preclude the sale of contaminated
milk in complying areas. Prior to the adoption of the PMO, ultra-high temperature
milk (UHT milk) from Quebec had been sold in Puerto Rico for fourteen years.
Upon the adoption of the new PMO, the UHT milk imported into Puerto Rico no
longer complied with import regulations. The Quebec production facilities were neither
quality-graded upon an accepted scale, nor had they been inspected by NCIMS.4
Based on lack of verifiable PMO compliance within the established grace-period, Puer-
to Rico closed itself to imports of Quebec UHT milk.
The Canadian Government protested this closure as unfair and coercive, in that
NCIMS refused to complete an inspection without Canadian membership in NCIMS.42
In the alternative, Canada maintained that the principle of national treatment had been
violated in requiring that Canadian milk production standards be "substantially similar"
37. Id. at para. 7.34.
38. Id.
39. UHT Milk from Quebec, USA 93-1807-01.
40. Id. at para. 3.9.
41. Id. at para. 3.27.
42. Id. at para. 3.31.
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to the PMO, rather than "equivalent" as required by Article 711 of the FTA. 3 Fur-
ther, Canada argued that a de facto discrimination against imports is set up by the
Puerto Rican regulations by basing the regulations on requirements which are routinely
met by U.S. producers, but which are foreign to Canadian producers." Finally, Cana-
da argued that even if the Puerto Rican measures were found to comply with the obli-
gations under the FTA, the application of those measures serves to nullify and impair
the benefits of the FTA reasonably expected by Canada, as protected by FTA Article
201 1.4
In response, the United States maintained that Puerto Rico, as a member of
NCIMS, had every right to implement and exercise technical regulations that protect
human life, pursuant to FTA Article 70 8(1 ).' Since the implemented regulations ap-
plied to both foreign and domestic milk, they also did not run afoul with the national
treatment policy of the FTA.4' The intent of the regulations was to increase the health
protection surrounding the production of milk, regardless of its origins. Because Cana-
da was unable to demonstrate that its UHT milk met those health protections, the Unit-
ed States maintained that Puerto Rico correctly denied admission of the UHT milk.48
Canada did not demonstrate equivalence during the grace-period provided before clo-
sure of the market; therefore, the importation of UHT milk was denied.
In evaluating the case, the panel determined in favor of the Puerto Rican restric-
tions on every point, except with regard to the impairment of the Canadian expecta-
tions under the FTA.49 Despite a lack of violation on every other account, the panel
determined that the PMO application to UHT milk from Quebec effectively eliminated
the benefits of the FTA which Canada could reasonably expect.' The panel found a
reasonable expectation that the UHT milk would not be excluded based both upon its
historical use and acceptance of that milk in the Puerto Rican market. Further, the
panel found that the nature of the FrA urges a cooperative attitude which was violated
by the closure of the milk market before a test of equivalency between the PMO and
the Canadian standards was conducted.
Again, the power of a member state, with the objective to protect its legitimate
interests, was precluded in the name of free trade. While Canada may or may not have
had some benefits of the F'A disturbed by the PMO application, they were clearly on
notice that either of the member states retained the right to establish reasonable stan-
dards to protect the life and health of humans. No evidence demonstrated that Puerto
Rico adopted the milk standards maliciously or with a protectionist attitude cloaked in
the guise of practicality; instead, the standards were adopted from an established Unit-
ed States milk-quality system with the intent of further reducing the risk of contami-
nated milk in Puerto Rico.
Further, the milk market was not immediately closed to the Canadians upon the
adoption of the PMO. A grace period granted Canada a reasonable length of time
between the of adoption of the PMO and the time of market closure in which to dem-
43. Id. at para. 4.6.
44. Id. at para. 4.7.
45. Id. at para. 4.18.
46. Id. at para. 4.20.
47. Id. at para. 4.24. See also FTA, supra note 5, arts. 501, 502.
48. UHT Milk from Quebec, USA 93-1807-01, at paras. 4.26-4.27, 4.37.
49. Id. at para. 6.
50. Id. at para. 5.58.
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onstrate compliance. Thus, to characterize the Puerto Rican actions as contrary to the
FTA is to ignore the basic provisions which allow reasonable TBTs.
3. The German Bier Case
Under Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent related European
case law concerning TBTs, there have been a number of cases that appear to circum-
vent a state's legitimate objective, including Commission v. Ireland' (dealing with the
labelling of foreign-made souvenirs) and Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt
Pvba" (dealing with misleading packaging of margarine). In one particular case,
Commission v. Germany," an action was brought against Germany based on the pro-
visions of the Biersteuergesetz. These provisions required that all products sold as
"bier" must be made of malted barley, hops, yeast and water alone. No product so
labeled as "bier" could contain maize, rice, or additives. This did not preclude the sale
of such products within the State of Germany, it only precluded the sale of such prod-
ucts as "bier".
The German government defended its prohibitions on two levels. Initially, Ger-
many extended a public health argument. This challenge hinged upon potential health
hazards posed by the special additives needed in the foreign manufacturer's brewing
process which are not allowed under the Biersteuergesetz. The European Court of
Justice refused to accept this health hazard theory because other member states allowed
such additives with no ill effect on public health.'
Germany's second, and far more persuasive, argument rested on the state's inter-
est in protecting consumers from being misled by a non-complying product. The Ger-
man consumer has been guaranteed by the Biersteuergesetz that when they buy "bier,"
they get a product that conforms with certain standards. Those standards have become
synonymous with the product and inherently require a certain quality which the con-
sumer is likely to expect and rely upon when making a purchase." To allow a non-
complying product to utilize the "bier" label is to allow foreign producers the opportu-
nity to take advantage of the German consumer.
The court rejected this consumer protection argument as well. While national
rules may have been applicable to domestic and imported products without distinction
in order to satisfy mandatory requirements regarding consumer protection, the court
found that such rules must be proportionate to the desired aim. Further, when two
possible measures exist to achieve the desired goal, the member state must select the
least restrictive measure available.56
The court found neither of these requirements satisfied by the German rules,
although this is exactly what those rules sought to accomplish. Germany did not intend
to prevent the non-complying beverages from being sold in the German market. In-
stead, the Biersteuergesetz would deny the categorization and subsequent labelling of
those beverages as "bier." In that way, consumers would be allowed to make a valid
and informed decision based on knowledge of the product purchases. Rather than being
51. 1981 E.C.R. 1625, 1 C.M.L.R 706 (1982).
52. 2 C.M.L.R 496 (1983).
53. 1987 E.C.R. 1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1988).
54. Id. at para. 38.
55. Id. at para. 26.
56. Id. at para. 28.
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restrictive, it seems that this is as open a position as possible for the government,
while still protecting its consumers.
In fact, this is the very stance sought by the court in the Cassis case.5" Because
of a lower alcohol content of French cassis, Germany sought to ban French cassis from
their markets on principles of public health and consumer protection. The court reject-
ed such a general ban of the product on those justifications because there was a less-
restrictive measure available to protect the public health and consumers-displaying
suitable information on the labeling of the product."
Further, in the "bier case," the court held that there was not a valid basis for
application of the discriminatory rules just because the German consumer defined the
product "bier" in accord with the German rules.
[Clonsumers' conceptions which vary from one member-state to the other are also
likely to evolve in the course of time within a member-state .... [T]he legislation
of a member-state must not "crystallise given consumer habits so as to consolidate
an advantage acquired by national industries concerned .... "
The court even went so far as to say that, because other member states hold the term
"bier" as a generic designation, the German designation should also be so generic.
6
0
The court maintained its stance despite the fact that it was German consumers that the
legislation sought to protect from being misled, and therefore it should have been a
German mindset that the court considered.
The danger of such a biased reading of Article 30 is painfully obvious. There is
the initial threat to the consumers of the importing state of being duped by products
and goods that the consumers are led to believe, by labelling, to be something they are
not. But further, states themselves are precluded from fulfilling their obligation to
properly protect their citizens.
Thus, despite what appears to be a very clear provision for a member state to
protect its legitimate interests through TBTs, both the EU and the FTA have seen
instances where the legitimate objectives of member states have been ignored in the
name of free trade. Article 904(4) of NAFTA has a similar potential for overriding
legitimate objectives of member states.61 The determination of whether a given TBT
is targeted at a legitimate objective under the NAFTA requirements is subjective and
fuzzy at best.
A NAFTA panel would be required to weigh the intent and purpose of the TBT
against the result of application of that TBT. If the panel were to focus too heavily on
the free trade purpose of the NAFTA, and lose sight of the protection negotiated for
and guaranteed by the very same agreement, a member state's legitimate objective
could easily be lost in the shuffle. In an effort to overrule a member state's alleged
legitimate objectives, a NAFTA panel could use the assessment of risk clause' to
find that the regulating state inaccurately analyzed the potential for harm; the confor-
mity assessment clause63 to find that the regulating state inaccurately determined that
57. Rewe-Zentral, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
58. Id.
59. Commission v. Germany, 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1988), at para. 32.
60. Id. at paras. 33-34.
61. Supra note 7.
62. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 907.
63. Id. art. 908.
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the goods were not in conformity to regulations at issue; or even the current interna-
tional standards' 4 to demonstrate that other regulations exist and are satisfied, though
they may be weaker than those in dispute.
While NAFTA is open to these potential distortions, to which both the provisions
of the Treaty of Rome and the FTA occasionally have succumb, it is not a predisposed
conclusion. The pro-active development of North American trade law jurisprudence is
a possible solution to this looming problem.
B. Establishing a Lowest Common Denominator
In conjunction with the rejection of legitimate objectives in the name of free
trade, both the EU and the FTA have shown tendencies of pushing themselves toward
an equilibrium of a lowest common denominator. In fact, significant opposition to the
current GATT proposal, to which the NAFTA framework is closely tied, reports a
similar claim against that trade agreement as well. As alleged by Lori Wallach, direc-
tor of Public Citizen's Trade Program, before the Senate Commerce Committee,
The effect of GATT on food and other product standards would be a "downward
pressure" to require worldwide harmonization at weaker standard levels.'
Ms. Wallach's claim is based on the GATT1-imposed obligation that governments use
accepted international standards when effective and appropriate. The fear is that, be-
cause of the disparity between levels of regulation between states, states with lower
regulations would be unable or unwilling to immediately upgrade their regulations to
the higher level. Therefore, because the goal of unified standards is key to free trade
agreements, the lower regulations would be applied. Further, the free development of
more stringent standards may be retarded because of an inherent reliance on the inter-
national status quo as a default when examining unequal regulation.
In UHT Milk from Quebec, Puerto Rico made a sincere attempt at improving the
quality of life for its citizens. However, the final report of the panel pushed Puerto
Rico in the opposite direction. Despite their efforts to tighten safety standards in the
name of better public health, Puerto Rico was hindered in the interest of not offending
a fellow member state who had not yet proven that their milk production was equiva-
lent to or satisfied the updated standards. Puerto Rico could have chosen to enforce the
standards on only domestic goods, but that decision would have unfairly favored for-
eign producers. Thus, the only other option was to put the importance of the Puerto
Rican health on hold until Canada sufficiently demonstrated a safety equivalency.
Likewise, the German Bier case demonstrates a comparable threat to the interests
of the consumer in the event that legitimate TBTs are disallowed. To allow the market-
ing of goods that fail to meet the purity standards, such as "bier," to be passed-off as
goods that meet those standards, an economic disadvantage is created against the con-
forming goods. It is no longer in the interest of a manufacturer to meet high standards
if the consumer is not granted the opportunity to differentiate between two distinct
classes of goods. Economically, it is more sound to lower standards (thereby lowering
costs) to achieve maximum competitiveness. Borrowing a term from American corpo-
rate law, this "race to the bottom" could likely drive the market to a balance of medi-
64. Id. art. 905.
65. Environmental Groups Express Opposition to GA7T Bill at Hearing, INT'L TRADE REPORTER,
Oct. 19, 1994, at 1607.
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ocrity and may serve to weaken the output quality of the member states as a result.
Thus, the consumer suffers by being denied quality goods and the opportunity to dis-
tinguish the quality goods from the sub-standard products. While it is true that such an
effect could be countered with labelling, labelling is only effective if the consumer is
able to read and understand the differences in products.
Again, these same hazards are potential stumbling blocks for NAFTA. Under
Article 906, NAFTA members are urged to make compatible the technical standards
established by one another.6 An importing party is required to accept an exporting
party's regulation when the exporting party satisfactorily demonstrates that the regula-
tion adequately fulfills the importing party's legitimate objective.67 The question of
what counts as a satisfactory demonstration inevitably arises.
In UHT Milk from Quebec, the United States gave Canada a set time-frame to
demonstrate compliance. Canada failed to do so and it remained unclear whether or not
the Canadian methods of milk production complied with the PMO. To force Puerto
Rico to accept the UHT milk without proof that it meets the established health stan-
dards both weakens the effect of the domestic regulation and potentially subjects the
citizens of that market to a product of lower quality than their government determined
to be acceptable.
Whether a comparable NAFTA panel would likewise find for the Canadian posi-
tion is unclear; however, this potential exists. If the panel were to overemphasize the
free trade purpose of the agreement and neglect the preserved legitimate interests of
the regulating member state, Article 906(4) could easily provide a basis to override the
importing state's interests. Further, a panel could determine that the importing state
failed to properly conduct an assessment of risk,' and therefore the adopted TBT
would be disregarded.
A very real potential result of this would be a softening of the health protection
granted to the importing state. If the exporting state is not held to the higher safety
standards, which are presumably more expensive, the domestic producers are at an
economic disadvantage if forced to comply. In what amounts to a lose-lose situation,
the government of the importing state is then faced with the option of either enforcing
this market inequality to the detriment of the domestic economy, or relaxing the safety
standards to allow both the domestic and foreign goods equal market access, albeit at a
less safe level.
In an attempt to deal with this problem, the United States, Canada and Mexico
have established the North American Trilateral Standardization (NATS) forum to dis-
cuss harmonization of product standards between the member states. The forum recent-
ly convened in Mexico City, the first since the official adoption of NAFTA. That
forum held discussions regarding construction and building regulations; medical devic-
es and technology; and accreditation programs between the member states for quality
systems. An American National Standards Institute (ANIA) representative defined the
long-term goal of the forum as "mak[ing] the flow of trade among the three partners as
smooth as possible."'
66. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906(4).
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 907.
69. Groups from NAFTA Partners Meet to Discuss Standards, Report Progress, 11 INT'L. TRADE
REP. 1616 (1994).
Journal of Legislation
Despite these efforts, however, it must be recognized that the threat of a lowest
common denominator resolution remains possible unless the member states remain
cognizant of the fact that they have the right to establish legitimate technical barriers,
and unless the enforcement bodies of NAFTA act to maintain such legitimate barri-
ers.
70
It is necessary for member states to have the power to enact TBTs that are legiti-
mate in nature and have the real ability to properly benefit the citizens of that state.
However, protective safeguards must also remain in order to protect against the im-
proper use of TBTs for purposes that are protectionist in nature. The ability to estab-
lish such a synthesis is there, it is merely a matter of realizing the issue.
IV. THE NEED FOR PRUDENT TRADE JURISPRUDENCE
In light of these problems with the regulation of TBTs in the framework of an
international trade agreement, the question arises as to how reasonable limits can be
placed on TBTs without infringing on the valid interests of member states. One of the
greatest hurdles of international agreements is the need to draft language that is loose
enough to serve its purpose, but tight enough to bind the member states through mutu-
al understanding.
The text of NAFTA Chapter 9 serves as a credible safeguard against the improp-
er and illegitimate establishment of TBTs. It is true that one of the primary purposes
of NAFTA is the elimination of improper TBTs between member states. However,
Chapter 9 also incorporates a number of safeguards against over-intrusion on a mem-
ber state's recognized legitimate interests which inherently require some form of TBT.
These safeguards can likewise be found in the FTA, the EU's treaty and case
law. While they have at times been overridden, each of these free trade coalitions has
also recognized the protection of a member state's legitimate objectives. Under the
FTA, in Lobsters from Canada," the binational panel found that a United States ban
on the marketing or transport of sub-sized live lobsters should be reviewed under the
"national treatment ' 2 provisions of the FTA.73 While the panel did not ultimately
decide on the propriety of the U.S. statute because it was beyond the terms of refer-
ence laid down by the parties, 74 by defining this as an issue of national treatment, the
panel appears to acknowledge the fact that a legitimate objective exists, with further
consideration needed. This is an important consideration to be noted, as it gives credi-
ble prominence to the notion of the legitimate objective of the member state.
Likewise, the EU has seen a development toward a more legitimate objective-
conscious standard for Article 30 cases. In what is deemed the turning point decision
for Article 30 case law,7 5 Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas
Francais76 found that a French marketing ban which delayed the release date of video
cassettes did not aim to regulate trade movement because it applied equally to both
domestic and foreign goods. A similar determination was also made in Torfaen BC v.
70. Id.
71. Lobsters from Canada, USA 89-1807-01.
72. FTA, supra note 5, art. 501(l).
73. Lobsters from Canada, USA 89-1807-01, at paras. 7.1.1-7.1.3.
74. Id. at para. 7.22.2.
75. Kamiel Mortelmans, Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market Circum-
stances, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1991).
76. 1985 E.C.R. 2605, 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1986).
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B & Q7 (concerning mandatory shop closure on Sundays) and in Quietlynn v.
Southend-on-Sea BC"8 (dealing with local prohibitions on pornographic material).
Thus, an established basis exists for a liberalized interpretation and application of
a member state's legitimate objectives. Just as these two free trade coalitions have
recognized the need for such protection of such objectives, so too should NAFTA. In
order to facilitate such a protection, and to avoid the mistakes demonstrated by their
predecessors, NAFTA's member states should convene the Committee on Standards-
Related Measures and draft an official statement of North American Trade Jurispru-
dence that lays out the philosophical basis to be used in future NAFTA decisions re-
garding TBTs.
Under Article 913(3)(b), the Committee is required to report annually to the
North American Free Trade Commission on the implementation of Chapter 9. Included
in one of the early reports should be such a statement of judicial philosophy to give a
basis by which both member states and the Committee itself can gauge future deci-
sions. While this statement could take any one of a number of forms, perhaps the most
useful would be to formulate the statement as a set of accompanying comments to the
official text of NAFTA. Understanding the role of the FTA as a model to NAFTA, the
Committee could cite cases such as UHT Milk from Quebec and Pacific Coast Salmon
in those comments to demonstrate the outer limits of treaty-intrusion into domestic
policy of member states.
The drafted comments would function similar to the advisory comments found in
various American legal codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The comments should include an inference that a TBT is legitimate
provided that it meets the national treatment standard and that it deals with at least one
of the legitimate objective exceptions specified in Article 915. In order to overcome
the presumption, the challenging member state would be obligated to demonstrate
either a malicious intent on the part of the regulating state or otherwise disprove the
legitimacy of the regulation's purpose. A failure to do so would result in the affirma-
tion of the regulation. Such an obligation is in keeping with the spirit of NAFTA,
which allows for legitimate protection.
Further, the comments should direct a Panel to strictly scrutinize any objective
that could be satisfied through the use of less restrictive means than the regulation in
question. Failure of such a scrutiny test would also overcome the presumption of valid-
ity, and would obligate the Panel to invalidate the restriction.
These comments would work in conjunction with the harmonization efforts of
the NATS forum previously mentioned. It would serve to fill any gaps that could not
be resolved by the forum, while respecting the successful compromises established. 9
The comments could be updated periodically to reflect such compromises and any
other relevant developments regarding TBTs.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of a free trade economic zone in North America has great potential
for expanding the economic welfare of each of the three member states. In the larger
picture, the region stands to gain a great deal from the agreement. However, it is para-
77. 1989 E.C.R. 765, 1 C.M.L.R. 337 (1990).
78. 3 C.M.L.R. 55 (1990).
79. Groups from NAFTA Partners, supra note 69.
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mount to keep in mind that the members of this organization have not given up their
sovereign interests to the extent of an economic union. Thus, credible consideration
must be given to each member state's rights to protect and preserve the quality of life
in each of their respective countries. Technical barriers to trade is one necessary way.
for a member state to either preserve or enhance that quality. The member states and
the North American Free Trade Commission have the responsibility to insure that the
practical and acceptable use of TBTs is not sacrificed blindly in the name of free
trade, to the detriment of the citizens of those states.
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